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This volume explores the interface of philosophy and existential therapy from six different 
theoretical perspectives. In this sense, the book focus on applied philosophy or 
philosophical therapy. Thus, the main conclusion from the book is that existential therapy 



















An Existential Study of Relational Alienation and Conflict in Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Ronald Laing 
 
Introduction 
In the tradition of Søren Kierkegaard, the central focus of existential theory is widely 
regarded as the subjectivity of the concrete and unique individual, assigning a subordinate 
status to social issues.  This paper will help to rectify this situation by introducing the 
concept of negative sociality as an analytical prism to study the problematization of 
relational alienation and conflict in Jean-Paul Sartre and Ronald D. Laing. Using this concept 
makes it possible to examine how Sartre and Laing elucidate the fundamental connection 
between human sociality and subjectivity. To make sense of the concept, I will related it to 
the ideas of sociality in Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber. 
 
Sociality to Heidegger and Buber  
Sociality is as an explicit issue to Heidegger and Buber, who both turn against the tendency 
towards solipsism within the tradition of subject-philosophy from Descartes to Kant. 
Essentially, this solipsism involves that philosophy only takes the existence of the self and 
not the existence of the other seriously, because there is no necessary link between the 
subject and other subjects or objects. According to René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, I 
must understand the other person from my own self, which tends to make the other an 
alien, since my knowledge the other is firmly rooted in the content of my subjective 
consciousness (Descartes 1998; Kant 1999).  
In ‘Being and Time’, Heidegger rejects the notion of the isolated subject by examining the  
ontological structure of human being as a Dasein (Being-there) that is always already in the 
world. Furthermore, Heidegger rejects the ontological separation between self and other 
by stating that Dasein exists as Mitsein, a Being-with others, as part of its Being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger 1996:118). Hereby, Heidegger only examines sociality as an essential feature of 
individual existence and not in itself (Schatzki 2008:233). However, since human beings exist 
in a primary coexistence with other human beings, one does not experience those others 
as alien beings from whom one distinguishes oneself. This ontological sociality is 
conditioned by Daseins responsibility for its own existence as possibility. Dasein can exist as 
inauthentic Being-with and loose itself in the they that is characterized by common 
impersonal relationships (Heidegger 1996: §29). Dasein can also exist as authentic Being-
with in genuine relationships, which requires that Dasein is brought back from the they to 
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realize its own Being-towards-death. Since death exclusively belongs to the jemeinigen 
Dasein, human being realizes its authenticity in “solitude rather than in negative sociality” 
(Manning 1993:53), and authentic sociality is therefore mediated by a sort of existential 
solidity.  
Similarly, in ‘I and Thou’ Buber Buber rejects the ontological separation between self and 
other by describing the basis of existence as a two-fold interaction between human beings 
and the world that furthermore can be separated into two kinds of attitudes. The secondary 
I-It attitude is the origin of the subject-experience in Descartes and Kant and represents a 
depersonalized sociality characterized by distance between the self (ego) and other beings 
(Levinas 2008:15; Buber 2004:30). The primary I-Thou relationship is a mutual one that 
takes place as a meeting between people as persons with a whole existence and it involves 
love. This true encounter represents personalized sociality and it resemble the authentic 
relationship in Heidegger’s theory. However, personal existence does not derive from a 
relation to one’s own Being-towards-death. Rather, personal existence involves an 
including relationship with the other as part of a dialogical subjectivity (Ibid: 28).   
Both Heidegger and Buber describe human being as constantly having to oscillate between 
two modes of sociality that they tend to conceive as ontologically neutral. However, Buber 
also explains modernity as containing an ontological crisis. Thus, modernity involves a 
movement from loving I-Thou modes of involvement to instrumental I-It ways of 
interrelating and in Buber there is a strong tendency towards an ethical understanding of 
the I-Thou attitude as more positive.  
 
Sartre and the Look 
The first and second part of Sartre’s ontological elucidation of human existence in ‘Being 
and Nothingness’ involves a distinction between two related realms of being: (1) the being 
of phenomena (being-in-itself), (2) and the human being of consciousness (being-for-itself). 
Fundamentally, this being-for-itself is freedom that is nothingness and as such transcendent 
negation of being.  
To reject solipsism, Sartre also introduces being-for-others as a third ontological category, 
accounting for a further aspect of human subjectivity. Originally, the other is not revealed 
to me as an object but as a free subject who makes me aware of my own objectiveness as 
potentially being seen through the others look as an object (Sartre 2008:280). Thereby, this 
existence of the other-as-subject is revealed to me as certain (ibid:302). 
Through the look, the other-as-subject reveals me to myself as having a self that is myself, 
and unlike in Descartes and Kant I cannot deduce this experience of me from my own 
consciousness. Rather, the experience is derived from an essential modification of my 
consciousness by the others gaze (ibid:262). Thus, unlike Buber, I do not become a whole 
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person but a modified existence through the encounter with the other person. 
Furthermore, against Heidegger’s conception of Being-with, this encounter involves 
alienation through: 
…a negation which posits the original distinction between the Other and 
myself as being such that it determines me by means of the Other and 
determines the Other by means of me (ibid:315) 
The encounter with the other reveals that the relationship between me and the other 
person is internal and not external.  However, my encounter with the other is one of 
negation of myself. It does not only gives me an experience of the other as an 
inapprehensible alien but also of me as an outside that I am partly alienated from because 
it is not totally under my understanding or control: The “other does not constitute me as an 
object for myself but for him” (ibid:275). In other words, I become aware of the other-as-a-
subject with a freedom that is not my transcending my own transcendence in a way that I 
am defenseless. To a certain extend my being-for-others is inapprehensible to me and it 
negates my capacity to freely interpret myself and though my encounter with the other 
constitutes possibilities to me those are alienated possibilities (ibid:263).  
To Sartre, sociality essentially seems to be a matter of restricted freedom establishing an 
awareness of alienation. I can overcome this transcendence of transcendence by relating to 
the other as a subject to an object, almost as in Buber’s I-it relationship, and thereby reduce 
him: I can transcend the others transcendence in turn and my former objectifier becomes 
the object. Consequently, all human relations can be perceived from a fundamental 
dialectic of domination, in which my being-for-others is matter of domination and 
subordination (ibid: 386). Thus, unlike Heidegger and Buber, to Sartre the being-for-itself is 
profoundly alone and initially he does not leave possibility for two subjectivities to engage 
fully in a mutual encounter:   
It is therefore useless for human reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: 
one must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by 
him. The essence of the relations between consciousness is not the Mitsein; 
it is conflict (ibid:429) 
Against Heidegger and Buber, the original meaning of being-for-others is conflict and 
sociality is fundamentally negative. In his play ‘No exit’, Sartre likewise states that “hell is 
other people” (Sartre 1955:47), and whereas Buber described love as an expression of a 
true encounter, to Sartre the project of love is fundamentally one of possessing the freedom 
and subjectivity of the beloved one (Sartre 2008:387-392). However, according to Sartre, I 
can seek to transcend the experience of social alienation and self-alienation by choosing 
myself authentically as freedom. B doing that, I set the freedom of others as a goal, which 
opens the possibility for genuine relationships (Sartre 2007:62), although Sartre fails to 
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make a full elucidation of the character of this relationship. Thus, firstly Sartre almost 
resemble Buber by describing how I become myself through interrelatedness, even though 
this is a negative mode of relating that modifies me. Secondly, Sartre rather resemble 
Heidegger by describing how I become an authentic self, capable of genuine sociality, 
through an individual instead of an intersubjective process. 
 
Laing and the Threat of the Other 
While Sartre describes how we are objects of others' look and how that make us feel 
exposed and imprisoned, in ‘The Divided Self’ Laing investigates a similar experience in 
order to understand the subjectivity of schizophrenic persons. Both Sartre and Laing grasp 
their approach as existential phenomenology, but Laing's ambition is therapeutic rather 
than philosophical. 
Like Sartre, Laing outlines the paradox that all human beings are at the same time separate 
from and related to other human beings as an essential part of their existence and, against 
Heidegger and Buber, that we are somehow alone because no other person is a “necessary 
part of our being” (Laing 1990a:26).  Quite similar to Sartre, Laing also makes a distinction 
between one’s being-for-oneself and one’s being-for-the-other and states that in any 
human relationship, the other is the object of intentionality for the own persons 
subjectivity. 
This also applies within orthodox psychiatry, which experiences the patient through a 
technical “vocabulary of denigration” as a “failure of adjustment” (ibid:27). With the words 
of Sartre, the psychiatrist is thus involved in a  transcendence of the patient’s transcendence 
by avoiding “thinking in terms of freedom, choice and responsibility” (ibid:27) and relating 
to the other as a subject to an object, that is only comprehensible within the prejudging 
language of the subject (ibid:38). Consequently, the relationship is a conflictual one of 
possession and alienation that creates the same division between consciousness and 
behavior involved in the schizophrenic experience. 
From an alternative position of love, the existential phenomenologist must leave his own 
world to learn how the patient experiences his world and himself in it. To do this, he must 
reorient himself towards a radical different way of being without prejudging the patient. 
Furthermore, Laing bears more resemblance to Buber than Sartre by opening the possibility 
for a close encounter if the schizophrenic meets someone “by whom he feels understood” 
(ibid: 165; Laing 1990b:39). Yet, opposite Buber, Sartre fails to provide a full elucidation of 
this interrelatedness.  
Apart from this, Laing gets close to Sartre’s description of the look, when he uncovers the 
schizoid as a person who:  
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…feels both more exposed, more vulnerable to others than we do, and more 
isolated (Laing 1990a:37) 
 
Rather than being a meaningless failure, schizophrenia is understandable as an existential 
strategy that a person invents to live in a situation with unlivable external pressure. 
Schizophrenia arises in situations where the schizoid person is lacking ontological security, 
and this makes everyday living a perpetual threat to the person’s self (ibid:42). As part of 
his insecurity, the schizoid person experiences sociality as a threatening reality, generating 
different types of anxiety. Thus, the person experience sociality as a negative dimension of 
existence: According to Laing, engulfment refers to a dread of losing one’s identity by 
interaction with others, and the person either gets involved in a constant battle or seeks 
isolation in order to avoid being absorbed by others. Petrification refers to the dread of 
being depersonalized as an object by the others look and turned into stone, and the only 
way to avoid this threat is to depersonalize the other by turning him into an object first 
(ibid:43-51). The resemblance to Sartre’s theory of being-for-others as a conflict regarding 
freedom is striking, although Laing only wishes to describe schizoid and not ordinary 
experience. This covers the fact that Sartre seeks to explore the ontological dimensions of 
sociality, while Laing rather wishes to explore its practical implications to certain people. 
To Sartre, I become a myself through interaction with others, and Laing likewise describes 
how the schizoid person forms a false self-system by means of social interaction: The 
problem of being-for-others is analyzed as multiple self-systems that are established by 
identification of the self with the fantasy of the persons by whom one is seen (ibid:117). 
While Sartre made sociality involve a kind of alienation from the self, Laing thus describes 
how sociality might lead individuals to a division between a “true” inner being-for-one-self 
without relations to others and an outer alienated false being-for-the-other involved in 
meaningless relatedness. 
‘The Divided Self’ primarily examines psychiatry as involved in a negative relation between 
psychiatrist and patient as well as schizophrenia as a subjective experience that occurs in 
relation to a negative conception of sociality. In his later work, Laing tries to explore 
schizophrenia as caused by negative social patterns between the schizophrenic and others 
(Laing 1990b:93). Thus, the negative perception of the connection between sociality and 




The concept of negative sociality has made it possible to distinguish between the perception 
of sociality in Buber and Heidegger on one side and in Sartre and Laing on the other side. 
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They all reject solipsism by examining sociality as fundamental aspect of human subjectivity. 
However, whereas Buber and Heidegger perceive this sociality in a neutral or positive way, 
Sartre and Laing initially perceive it in a negative way as fundamentally being a matter of 
alienation and conflict. We establish our socialized subjectivity through negative relation to 
others. 
 
There are variations in the projects of Sartre and Laing, and whereas Sartre sees conflict and 
alienation as general conditions of existence, Laing only examines the implications of 
negative sociality to certain people. However, from these diverse positions they each 
provide an option for the individual to transcend negative sociality through either an 
authentic choice or a true encounter and then engage in genuine relationships like the ones 
described by Heidegger and Buber. Sartre and Laing positively widen the existential 
approach to human reality by exploring the negative dimensions of sociality that are not 
properly covered within Heidegger’s and Buber’s attempts to transgress the existential 
isolation of solipsism. However, in order to present an appropriate existential theory of the 
phenomenon of negative sociality they both fail to provide a comprehensive elucidation of 
the positive forms of sociality and interventions.    
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Existential Teleology and Ethics 
From Aristotle to Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmy van 
Deurzen and Michel Foucault 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1980’s, parts of philosophy has taken an interest in the revitalization of the ancient 
Greek teleological ethics as a response to the inability of modern moral philosophy – since 
Kant – to set concrete goals for life (Foucault 1997; MacIntyre 1997; Nussbaum 1993; 
Nussbaum 2001). The question of the good life was significant to ancient Greek and Roman 
Philosophy, but it has vanished from modern academic philosophy. Now the sciences and 
social institutions answer the questions of how to live and what the goal and purpose of life 
are, but they reduce the good life to a technological issue. Even though modern academic 
philosophy does not take an interest in the good life, the existential tradition has reflected 
on human life and living since the middle of the 19th Century.  In this chapter, I will examine 
whether the existential tradition implies a teleological conception of the content and 
direction of the good life that can form an alternative basis for modern ethics. Based on an 
examination of Aristotle's ethics and the ethics of the technological age, I will therefore 
outline the implicit teleological ethics in Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmy van 
Deurzen and Michel Foucault. 
 
From Aristotelian ethics to the ethics of the technological age 
Philosophers and historians usually regard Aristotle’s ethics as one of the best 
representatives of ancient Greek ethics. Aristotle’s ethical approach base on a strong 
version of teleology. Teleology is an explanation for a phenomenon in function of its end or 
goal (Aristotle 1994: 1095a). Aristotle explains the end or goal (causa finalis) of human 
existence as human flourishing (eudaimonia). Human beings achieve flourishing through a 
balanced use of human reason in everyday living as well as through the contemplation of 
universal harmony. According to Aristotle, the essence of human being is reason, and 
through the balanced use of reason in daily life, human being can cultivate a number of 
virtues and bring forth its substantial and universal form, which is already potentially 
present in the individual. 
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According to Heidegger, this bringing-forth is a concealment of something into 
unconcealment, which makes it appear as it is in itself (Heidegger 1977). Bringing-forth is 
essential to the teleological reason of ancient Greece philosophy, and Heidegger states that 
it differs from the challenging that rules in modern technology as a dominant way of 
revealing Being in modern times (Heidegger 1977: 14). Through this technological revealing, 
the human beings of modernity position themselves in the middle of the world and assume 
dominion over everything, including themselves. Thus, things and human beings only have 
meaning by becoming available as resources that are under control.  
The revealing of modern technology contains the ethical belief that life is only significant 
and has quality in its readiness for use as a resource. This idea reflect in everything from 
human resource thinking in modern organizational theory to the notion that the goal of 
individual life is to develop skills and potentials and become a success through performance 
and achievements.  
Foucault launched the equivalent term of bio-power to describe a form of power that takes 
human life as an issue, and this form of power emerges in the 19th Century (Foucault 1996: 
Ch. 5). In the 20th and 21st century, this power over life spreads, and the state and the 
individual human being become preoccupied with optimizing life (Rose 2006). Within this 
horizon, human beings conceive life as the essence of their Being, involving an essential 
functionality of life. Thus, the good life is perceived as a functional resource, grasped 
through terms such as quality of life, health and normality. 
 
Vague teleology of authenticity: Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul 
Sartre 
The existential tradition involves a rejection of the strong versions of teleology, viewing 
human nature as having an essence that defines the true end of human being (MacIntyre 
1997: 54). However, the philosophy of Kierkegaard might be said to involve a vague 
teleology, because it conceives human existence as a process of freedom that involves 
certain choices as a condition for the goal of an authentic coming into existence. 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard describes this coming into existence as a dialectical progression 
of three stages on the way of life that involves different existential states. However, since 
this progression is wholly dependent on individual choice, it is also possible to live an unreal 
inauthentic life, where one does not come into existence and become oneself. 
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To live according to the ethics of the technological age is an expression of inauthenticity in 
the first stage of this process of self-realization. Kierkegaard describes this stage as involving 
the philistine and the aesthetic form of life. The philistine has an unreflective lifestyle and 
he or she just lives from a mainstream consciousness according to the norms and values 
that exist in society. The aesthetic lives with a multitude of possibilities and desires sensual 
goals that are external to the self and might provide empty experiences of success 
(Kierkegaard 1964: XXVIII, 153; 1988: 192). However, to exist in truth means that one enters 
the ethical stage by stepping out from the crowd and making a choice between the 
opportunities one faces, whereby one can find one’s own vocation. Unlike the ethics of 
technology, this process is not about self-realization as performance and achievement but 
about finding oneself. Yet, the ethical stage contains the same anthropocentrism as the 
technological way of being. According to Kierkegaard, one cannot become truly oneself only 
by oneself.  In the religious stage, one must go beyond human reason and open oneself to 
God by a leap into faith (Kierkegaard 1964: XXVI, 124): To achieve the highest existential 
stage involves transgressing the human, instead of pursuing the goals that human culture, 
technology or reason gives. 
The idea of an authentic orientation in life as a goal of existence is a recurring theme in the 
existential tradition and found in Sartre’s writings.  
Sartre transformed Kierkegaard's ideas about the existential process of freedom into a 
secular theory of human being as an indefinite being that has no original essence but must 
create itself through choices. Thus, in ‘Being and Nothingness’, Sartre makes a distinction 
between the being of phenomena (being-in-itself) and the human being of consciousness 
(being-for-itself) (Sartre 2008: xii-xiii). The defining characteristic of being-for-itself is 
freedom and according to Sartre, this freedom equivalent to nothingness and as such 
transcendent negation of being. Being-for-itself is conscious of itself, and following Sartre, 
the consciousness of freedom involves the recognition by the Self of the responsibility of 
making choices and the discovery of facing nothingness in the past and the future. The 
consciousness of freedom is so anxiety provoking that the individual tends to direct 
negations towards itself as an attempt to avoid facing anxiety. This self-deceiving flight from 
anguish towards reassuring beliefs is an attitude that Sartre calls bad faith (ibid: 29, 49). 
Thus, trough bad faith we seek to hide the truth from ourselves and escape the 
responsibility for making free choices by making our selves passive subjects of external 
forces or an inner essence.  In an effort to deepen his conception of human freedom, Sartre 
describes how every human choice must be: 
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… explained within the perspective of a larger choice in which it would be 
integrated as a secondary structure (ibid: 455) 
Thus, in order to ground itself, the individual self needs existential ‘projects’, which must be 
based in his or her choice of a fundamental project. This ‘life project’ constitutes a person’s 
totality by expressing his or her fundamental attitude to life (ibid: 570). Sartre elaborates 
how this project involves the fundamental freedom of the Being-for-itself, perceived a pre-
reflective project toward a goal that grounds all secondary motives and reasons (ibid: 463).  
However, the individual is able to choose a project of self-deception in bad faith, whereby 
he or she hides his or her real nature as Being-for-itself and lives as a Being-in-itself (ibid: 
615). This is precisely what is at stake in technological ethics, where the individual chooses 
to live and shape his or her Being from the idea that it has an essential function. 
Yet, the self is able to avoid self-deception by choosing a project of authenticity in good 
faith, whereby one faces one’s own freedom and seeks to become what one freely chooses 
to be. In this way, freedom is the telos of existence, and because the exercise of freedom 
creates values that all human beings could experience, this authentic project expresses a 
universal dimension in the singularity of a human existence. 
 
The art of existence: Emmy van Deurzen and Michel Foucault 
As a reaction towards the instrumentalism and reductionism of modern technology, Emmy 
van Deurzen has attempted to combine Greek ethics and existential therapy in an 
interpretation of living as an art in the classical sense. According to Deurzen, human beings 
live in a constant confrontation with existential challenges that lead to anxiety, and as with 
Kierkegaard and Sartre, they can handle this anxiety in two fundamental ways: They can 
flee it in-authentically and escape into cultural visions of the perfect life, or they can face it 
authentically and take responsibility. This authentic living involves engaging in all 
dimensions of life and following the direction in life that one's conscience dictate as the 
right, whereby one becomes author of one’s own destiny (Deurzen 2009: 43).  
Deurzen’s approach is teleological, because she speaks of the truth of life as a guideline for 
practical living. However, far less than Sartre, she addresses human freedom as the essence 
of this guideline. According to Deurzen, the individual must balance freedom from a sense 
of necessity, since she perceives life as stretched between a series of poles, which one must 
learn to embrace. 
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The art of living is not an innate ability but a capacity that the individual must learn through 
experience and by help from wise mentors. Opposed to a modern conception of 
technological expertise, this art of living base on an idea of wisdom. Furthermore, the ideal 
of life is not a technological norm of normality or performance. The ideal to follow one’s 
own path of openness in relationship to oneself, other people, the world and spirituality. 
Most of Foucault's writings include a negative teleology of freedom that point to his 
investigation of how freedom in the modern age is dominated by technology, whereby 
ethics is linked to social, economic and political structures (Foucault 1997b: 261).  
Against this background, in his late works Foucault studied ancient ethics, which he believed 
could inspire modern ethics. Similar to Deurzen, he thought that ethics should be an 
aesthetics of life, formed as an art of living. However, contrary to Deurzen, Foucault thinks 
that freedom should be the ontological condition of ethics. Thus, ethics must be a reflected 
practice of freedom, a certain conscious way of being and of behaving (Foucault 1997c: 
284). Teleology is to be understood as a mastery of oneself and in this context, contrary to 
Kierkegaard, Sartre and Deurzen, Foucault rejects the notion of authenticity, because he 
thinks that this notion points to the idea of a true self (Foucault 1997b: 262). Instead, 
Foucault wants to link the theoretical insights of the existential tradition of a practice of 
creativity. Foucault is inspired by Nietzsche, and the self is perceived as a form that can be 
shaped and reshaped so that we can master ourselves and create ourselves as a work of art 
instead of being dominated technologically as resources (ibid: 262).  
 
Conclusion 
The existential tradition contains the teleological foundation of an ethical approach that 
may serve as alternative to the so-called technological ethics. The concept of authenticity 
from Kierkegaard, Sartre and Deurzen may serve as a response to the technological 
domination of individual existence, and the existential concept of freedom from 
Kierkegaard, Sartre and Foucault may serve as a response to the cultural and institutional 
colonization of existence. 
This chapter has been interested in whether the teleological dimension of the existential 
tradition might serve as a guideline for an alternative way of living. Deurzen and Foucault 
makes the most explicit rebellion against the technological age and according to these 
authors, an alternative ethics should take the form of an art of living, an art of existence. 
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The teleological question is whether authenticity or self-mastery should serve as existential 
goals of ethical practice. Furthermore, what is needed to actually to rethink the teleological 
dimension of the existential tradition, to see how a conception of the goal of life goals may 
look like in the 21st Century.  
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The Relevance of Aristotelean Ethics to the Conception 
of Existential Psychotherapy  
 
Introduction  
Existential psychotherapy attempts to challenge the technological understanding of 
psychotherapy and reductionist tendencies in modern medicine. It does so by developing a 
psychotherapeutic practice based on a more holistic understanding of human being, not 
aimed at curing or healing patients but rather at achieving authenticity for clients. The main 
theoretical problem for existential psychotherapy is that it wants to understand itself as a 
psychotherapeutic method, commonly understood as a form of medical technology. Yet, 
existential psychotherapy wants to distance itself from the medical and technological 
framework of understanding and practice. This paper tries to solve this problem by 
discussing whether and how it is possible to re-conceptualize existential psychotherapy as 
an Aristotelian practice of ethics.  
 
Psychotherapy as technology and applied science  
According to Martin Heidegger, modern technology is the dominant way of revealing Being 
in modernity and it is characterized by a challenging (Heidegger 1977: 14). Through this 
technological revealing, human being anthropocentrically positions itself in the middle of 
the world and assumes dominion over everything including itself. Human beings, then, only 
have the meaning of being available as resources. There is a widespread tendency to 
conceive psychotherapy as a form of technology and applied science. According to Joseph 
Dunne, in modern times, we tend to define rationality as coextensive with technology. We 
rationalize almost every domain of human engagement from an instrumental reason, 
concerned with instructional outcomes (Dunne 1993: 5). Likewise, Louis Berger criticizes 
this attitude in contemporary psychotherapy by addressing what he terms techno-
therapies.  According to Berger, these techno-therapies are characterized by a strong 
reliance on instrumental thought and by an attempt to establish empirical evidence for the 
efficacy of the instructional outcomes of therapies, especially in terms of symptom-




The rationality and essence of arts  
Existential psychotherapy must to be based on an alternative to the technological reason 
and challenging of Being, underlying the techno-therapies, and here Emmy van Deurzen 
indicate that one can turn to the kind of rationality, which is embedded in the practice of 
arts (Deurzen 2005: 216). According to Heidegger, the revealing of Being involved in this 
practice is different from the challenging that rules in modern technology. Thus, art is a kind 
of revealing characterized as a bringing-forth of something from concealment into un-
concealment to appear as it is in itself (Heidegger 1977: 14). In other words, the rationality 
of arts is involved in a bringing forth of that which is already present but hiding in the 
phenomena.  
 
Ancient ethics  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the need within philosophy to find an alternative to technological 
rationality led to a widespread revitalization of ancient ethics as an art of living. Among 
others, Martha Nussbaum highlighted how the ancient idea of ethics did not involve a 
technological challenge of human being as a resource. Ancient ethics rather involved a 
rational addressment of existential and emotional needs, embedded in a practice aimed at 
bringing forth human flourishing (eudaimonia) (Nussbaum 1994: 3). Whereas modern 
human being tries to control itself and its surroundings as resources, the ancient Greeks 
considered human life as vulnerable to factors beyond human control. The Greeks invented 
ethics in a search to develop a rational art of living, dedicated to the realization of the good 
human life, safe from luck and reliance upon the external world (Nussbaum 1997: 3). Thus, 
the Greeks had the idea that logos is to illnesses and maladies of the human soul as medical 
treatment is to illnesses of the human body (Aristotle 1994: II:iv.). More specifically, this 
meant that ethics as an art of living should create human flourishing as a healthy state of 
the soul in balance, whereas the art of medicine should create bodily health by getting the 
body into balance  
 
Aristotelian ethics  
Usually, Aristotelian ethics is thought to be the clearest representative of ancient Greek 
ethics.  Aristotle’s ethics is grounded in a naturalistic teleology. That is, Aristotle describes 
how human existence has an end (causa finalis) and this end is human flourishing 
(eudaimonia), which is the goal of practical philosophy. Thus, whereas theoretical 
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philosophy is dealing with theoria as exact knowledge of necessary facts, Aristotle states 
that practical philosophy deals with praxeis as human actions in a changing life. All human 
actions have an ultimate end, which is human flourishing. Likewise, the purpose of practical 
philosophy is not to achieve cognition or knowledge but to be good practice (eupraxia) that 
has the aim of attaining flourishing. According to Aristotle, human being is not only 
individual. It is also social being. Whereas ethics is the art of the good life dealing with the 
flourishing of the individual, politics is the art of the good life concerned with the flourishing 
of society.  
Thus, ethics is a rational answer to the question of what it takes to become a good person 
and thereby achieve the good life. Human flourishing is the unfolding of the substantial and 
universal form of human Being (causa formalis). Thus, the end of human being is the 
realization of its essential capacities that are already present (ibid, I.vii.).  
In the discourse of ethics, human flourishing is an expression of human excellence. Since 
human being is a rational animal, human excellence must be a cultivated exercise of the 
capabilities and capacities of the human soul in accordance with a rational principle. Thus, 
human excellence is a cultivated use of reason regarding human emotions and actions (ibid, 
I.vii). In other words, human flourishing is living in accordance with the cultivation of an 
excellent character, and the excellent exercise of human capabilities and capacities is called 
virtues (arethé):  
…the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in conformity 
with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, 
in conformity with the best and most perfect among them (ibid, I.vii.)  
The virtues of the good character are habits or dispositions to act in certain ways in response 
to certain situations. Everyone has a natural potential for a good character, and we develop 
our character from practice. By cultivating his or her virtuous character through practice, 
the individual brings forth his or her substantial form for living, which is already present but 
hiding in him or her.  
Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtues. Moral virtues are not innate, 
but acquired by developing the habit of exercising them. A moral virtue involves both the 
rational and the irrational (emotional) part of the soul, since moral virtue implies to have 
rational control of the desires, feelings and emotions and to be able to use the right extend 
of a particular desire, feeling or emotion with a particular kind of action. Thus, virtuous 
action requires that the individual is able to choose how to respond to his or her own 
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desires, feelings and emotions. Aristotle define virtuous disposition as a mean between two 
extremes of excess and defect. Aristotle does not provide the actual content of the virtues 
from an abstract principle, but through a phenomenological mapping of prevailing moral 
conceptions in which the mean functions as a practical principle of structuring (ibid, III.vi.-
V.i.).  
Virtuous action also requires the development of an intellectual virtue for being able to 
choose, deliberate and take control regarding actions in response to emotions. This 
practical wisdom (phronesis) is not developed through theoretical studies but is acquired 
through reflexive experience as an ability to see the right thing to do under the 
circumstances (ibid, VI). In other words, the moral person's quest is aimed at the good and 
it is accompanied by an experience-based insight into the good that generates moral 
awareness and responsibility. Thus, human flourishing is not a matter of applying technical 
or theoretical knowledge in living. Rather, flourishing is a matter of learning by cultivating 
a good ability to understand and manage one’s emotional capacities in situations and to act 
on them in a proper way.  Accompanied by the development of a practical wisdom regarding 
the ability to deliberate and choose for one self in order to achieve or maintain a good life, 
based on life experiences. This realization of one’s existential potentials involves that one 
holds oneself in a stable equilibrium of the soul, in order to choose actions knowingly and 
for their own sake. 
  
From Aristotle to Deurzen  
Technology is applied scientific knowledge possessed by experts, which is involved in an 
instrumental challenging of resources. Practical wisdom (phronesis) is practical knowledge, 
characterizing a person who knows how to live well. People learn this wisdom by doing and 
it does not deal with instructional outcomes but with praxis, which is the conduct and affairs 
of one’s life as a citizen within a community and praxis has its end in itself. Following 
Heidegger and Foucault, ethics is an art of living, which aims at bringing forth the hidden 
natural potentials in the individual for realizing his or her ability to live well. The individual 
must use reflective practices that seek to transform oneself and thereby creating one’s life 
as a work of art (Foucault 1997 a-c).  
While existential thinking involves a rejection of Aristotelian essentialism, existential 
psychotherapy still carries several similarities with Aristotelian ethics. Heidegger sees the 
human being (Dasein) as a field of possibilities and he describes how human being must 
project itself in relation to these possibilities in a certain way in order to achieve an 
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authentic existence (Heidegger 1993). As in the concept of praxis, Dasein is at the outset 
concerned with itself and its own possibilities and Medard Boss describes how the 
existential guilt of human being consists in the individuals failing to fulfill all its possibilities 
(Boss 1963: 271). According to Boss, the aim of therapy is to help people accept their 
possibilities and assemble them to an authentic self. This is partly reflected in Deurzen who 
states that authentic living involves that the individual engages in all dimensions of life and 
follows the direction in life that his or her conscience dictate as the right so that the 
individual human being becomes author of its own destiny (Deurzen 2009: 43). There is a 
striking similarity between Deurzen’s concept of authenticity and Aristotle's concept of 
flourishing. Similar to Aristotle's ethics, Deurzen conceives existential psychotherapy as an 
art of living directed at the unfolding of existential potentials. Furthermore, just as Aristotle 
describes the prerequisite for the good life as the learning of a balancing mean between 
extremes in life situations, Deurzen describes how human being must accept to live as 
suspended between various polarities. Aristotle describes how the development of 
practical wisdom and a good character must base on a phenomenological understanding of 
the virtues that exist in society. Deurzen likewise describes how the development of the 
individual’s life wisdom and ability to live must be rooted in a phenomenological 
understanding of the values and assumptions contained in this person's truth. At the same 
time, this person is not perceived as an isolated being but as related to other people. 
Deurzen describes these processes in terms of learning, not in terms of application of 
scientific knowledge, and just as in Aristotle’s ethics, existential therapy must focus on the 
process itself as a goal instead of pursuing specific instructional outcomes. The concept of 
practical wisdom (phronesis) provides us with the possibility of giving a more precise 
understanding of the type of knowledge, involved in existential psychotherapy: A reflected 
practical wisdom based on learning from life experiences. This kind of knowledge is not 
technological but philosophical. Furthermore, the idea of flourishing as a bringing-forth of 
the genuine possibilities that lie hidden in the individual human being resembles Deurzen’s 
idea about identifying the life skills that the individual already has instead of focusing on 
instrumental skills. The idea of flourishing also informs her particular interpretation of the 
goal of authenticity as a concept for the good life that may serve as an alternative to 
technological life goals of perfection or normality.  
 
Conclusion  
We are able to conceptualize existential psychotherapy as an Aristotelian practice of ethics. 
This conceptualization serves to solve some of the conceptual and philosophical problems 
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involved in the discussion of the nature of existential psychotherapy. If we omit the 
universalism and essentialism, the inspiration from Aristotelian ethics might also open some 
new perspectives on therapeutic practice. In my own therapeutic practice, I have 
successfully used the idea of a bringing-forth of hidden potentials as a guide. The idea of 
the balanced life has also given me a lot of inspiration and to me the idea of human 
flourishing as an objective of existential psychotherapy somehow seems more usable than 
the idea of authenticity.  
The concept of practical wisdom helps to inform the rationality involved in Deurzen’s 
conception of existential psychotherapy as an art of living. This art involves a reflective 
capacity to learn through life experience and with help from wise mentors, and instead of 
a modern concept of technological expertise, this art of living base on an idea of practical 
life wisdom. Furthermore, the ideal of life, which is involved, is not a technological norm of 
normality or performance but an ideal of following one’s own path of openness in a 
fundamental relationship to oneself, other people, the world and spirituality.  
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A Discussion of Narcissistic Sexuality 
 
Introduction  
The narcissistic disorder represents a complex and often misunderstood phenomenon, 
named after the mythological character Narcissus who could only love himself, rejecting 
anyone who attempted to relate to him in an intimate way. To the extent that we consider 
love and sexuality as related, the concept of ’narcissism’ represents an apparent paradox in 
the understanding of human sexuality and its role and function in psychological life. 
However, although the writings of Sigmund Freud link the concepts of narcissism and 
sexuality, researchers and writers have paid little attention to the relation. In this article, I 
will discuss the phenomenon of narcissistic sexuality in order to investigate how 
conceptualizations of sexuality relate to the existential construct of narcissism within the 
ancient Greek, the early existential and the psychoanalytic tradition.  
 
Ancient Greek tradition: Sexuality and the myth of Narcissus  
According to Peter Thielst, the ancient Greeks considered Eros as a fate of humanity that 
was given by the gods. Thus, Eros was a quality that one should not avoid or attempt to 
overcome but accept as a necessary force of human nature, enabling the family’s continued 
existence (Thielst 2011: 17). From a slightly different perspective, Michel Foucault explores 
how the Greeks concerned themselves with sexual behavior and pleasure as an ethical 
problem of self-practice. In addition, Foucault shows how the Greeks generally conceived 
sexuality as necessary force that could bring harmony into human nature. Yet, he states 
that the Greeks also thought that this force had the power to destroy a human being if it 
denies or practices its sexuality in an uncontrollable way. Therefore, men had to fear all 
excess and practice self-control in the sexual control they exercised over women as part of 
the household (Foucault 1992: part 3).  
Correspondingly, the problem of Narcissus was, according to the myth told by Ovid, not his 
love for himself. The problem was the fact that Narcissus did not follow his human nature 
by rejecting the love of the women who fell in love with him. Thus, the idea of Hybris is a 
phenomenon caused by deficiency. Because the problem of Narcissus consists in his 
transgression of humanity, related to his denial of sexuality and his love for hos own mirror 




Early existential theory:  
Søren Kierkegaard’s problematization of the self-absorbed seducer  
In his book ‘Either-Or’, Søren Kierkegaard uses the figure of Narcissus to explore the so-
called aesthetic stage of existence. This stage of existence represents persons who are living 
for the immediate satisfaction of the senses, being only able to see themselves in terms of 
the senses. The aesthetic is a kind of person who is living on the very surface of things, 
without internalizing actions or awareness of his or her own subjectivity (Kierkegaard 2009).  
Kierkegaard examines different types of aesthetes and one of them is Johannes, who is a 
seducer, only concerned with the erotic conquest of women for the sake of his own 
pleasure. The character of Johannes is an example of the self-absorbed kind of aesthete, 
but Kierkegaard shows how this kind of self-absorbing behaviour does not derive from self-
love but from fragile and fluctuating self-esteem. Thus, this self-absorbedness represents a 
compensatory escape. Through this self-delusion, Johannes seduces himself to overlook his 
own self. Through the attention he gets from women, he avoids feeling his own inner pain 
and despair.  
At last he fell in love with himself like Narcissus (Kierkegaard 1968: III-B37) 
Thus, Kierkegaard compares Johannes to Narcissus, because they both fall in love with their 
own self-reflection as extensions of themselves. However, they are both convinced that 
their self-reflections are not extensions of themselves. Johannes is self-absorbed, smug and 
grandiose in his appearance and Kierkegaard explains the erotic dimension in the case of 
Johannes as a matter of pure self-projection and self-lust. Just as Kierkegaard does with the 
example of Don Giovanni. However, similar to Ovid, Kierkegaard perceives this self-
absorbedness as a matter of deficiency and describes how it covers a form of despair 
regardless of any attempt to conceal it. According to Kierkegaard, the solution is to 
acknowledge oneself and take responsibility for one’s own life. This is required in order for 
sexuality to become intimacy with a beloved person in relations if sharing and commitment. 
A person, whom one perceives as a whole person rather than just an object of lust (Holly 
1984: 115). Similar to Plato’s Symposium, the existential stages in Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
involves an evolution of love and sexuality from a basic instinct to a pure love of Beauty or 
God. However, whereas Plato final stage involves a rejection of earthly sexuality, to 




Psychoanalytic perspective  
The clinical conception of narcissism originates from Sigmund Freud, who linked it to the 
sexual development of the ego. Freud distinguished between: (1) A primary narcissism, 
which is a natural part of early development. The development of primary narcissism begins 
from an autistic and autoerotic phase, preceding the relation to an external object as tied 
to the child itself. (2) A secondary and pathological narcissism occurring later in 
development whereby sexual drive is withdrawn from objects due to object-frustration 
through a mechanism of defense, and then re-invested in the ego as self-libido (Freud 
2001).  
Thus, similar to Ovid and Kierkegaard, Freud perceives narcissism as grounded in a tragic 
mode of existence. However, later prominent psychoanalysts as Karen Horney, Alice Miller 
and James Masterson are closer to Kierkegaard. They all perceive the pathological narcissist 
as a person who does not love him-/herself too much but rather too little, compensating 
for a deficient state of self-alienation or self-fragmentation that involves lack of self-love 
(Horney 1994; Miller 2008; Masterson 1990). Heinz Kohut likewise distinguishes between 
healthy and pathological narcissism. He describes how persons with so-called narcissistic 
personality disorders might attempt to counteract the subjectively painful feeling of self-
fragmentation by forced sexual activity (Kohut 2009: 119). Hence, there is an overlap with 
Kierkegaard’s seducer, pointing to narcissists being fixated on sexual gratification rather 
than enduring intimacy. 
Otto Kernberg represents the tradition of object relations. He emphasizes the way in which 
the affectively charged internalization and structuring of early object relations is 
fundamental to the development of the ego and human motivation. According to Kernberg, 
human sexuality is rooted in biological functions, whereas sexual desire originates in the 
early relationship between child and caregivers. During puberty, this desire becomes erotic 
desire, including the desire for a sexual relationship with a particular person (Kernberg 
1998: Ch. 1+2). The capacity in a person for mature sexual love involves the experience and 
maintaining of a love relation with another person, integrating tenderness and empathy. 
Eroticism presupposes the development in this person of a capacity for whole or integrated 
object relations that involves achievement of a self-identity (ibid.: 87).  
Kernberg also states that severe psychopathological dysfunctions disturb the development 
of this capacity for mature sexual love. He conceives the common cause of borderline and 
narcissistic personality disorders as being a failed integration of the sexual and aggressive 
charged self and object representations, leading to a lack of ability to integrate positive and 
negative introjections and identifications (Kernberg 2004: 265). Thus, pathological 
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narcissism is on the same level as borderline personality. However, narcissists are persons 
who have excessive need to be loved, but only have a marginal capacity to feel love and 
empathy towards others. These persons have experiences of emptiness if they do not get 
their desire for admiration and power satisfied. Furthermore, they feel envy towards others 
who have what they themselves want. They idealize those whom they believe can give them 
what they need and despise and devalue others. Basically, narcissists exploits others, but 
this surface is a defense against a paranoia which is dominated by a fundamental rage. 
Almost like in Kierkegaard's description of the self-absorbing persons core despair, 
Kernberg shows how the narcissistic person's apparent lack of object relations, does tend 
to mask scary and aggressive laden object relations, lacking good internal objects.  
The mature position involves an ability to associate sex with caring and loving, perceiving 
commitment as the most important aspect of relationships.  According to Kernberg, the 
narcissistic persons are incapable of mature sexual love and they have a tendency to 
perceive all sexual relationships as games between exploiters and exploited (Kernberg 
1998: 95). Similar to Kierkegaard’s seducer, the narcissistic persons rather tends to 
associate sexuality with power and influence. Research shows that narcissism is likely to be 
related to histories of short-term sexual conquests and low relationship commitment 
(Foster 2006: 367). If they involve themselves in a relationship, they will often choose to 
engage with partners that idealize them, or partners who possess some admired properties, 
such as fame or wealth, which they can incorporate in a symbolic way for narcissistic 
gratification. In the context, Kernberg quotes van der Waals for saying that the problem 
isn’t that narcissists only loves themselves and no others, but that they love themselves just 
as poorly as they love others.  
 
Conclusion: Narcissistic sexuality and therapy  
From Ovid to Kierkegaard and forward to Kohut and Kernberg there is a close linking of the 
perception of Narcissus and / or narcissism to conceptualizations of sexuality, involving a 
paradox associated with a state of deficiency. These writers articulate Narcissus and 
narcissism as problems concerning sexuality that must be analyzed and handled for the 
improvement or retention of human wellbeing.  
However, it is also clear that neither Ovid, Kierkegaard or Kernberg understands narcissism 
as involving isolated or specific sexual disorders that must be conceived as objects of 
specific sex therapies based on research findings (Denman 2004: 256). They rather perceive 
narcissistic sexuality as a secondary aspect of narcissism. According to these authors, 
narcissism must perceived from an understanding of maturation or ethical formation of the 
individual person. Following Kierkegaard’s and Kernberg’s perspectives, the ambition of this 
perception is to help a basically vulnerable, frustrated and desperate core of a person.  
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In this article, I have demonstrated a close link between narcissism and sexuality. 
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that narcissistic sexuality has the characteristic of being 
fixated on sexual or egocentric gratification rather than on enduring intimacy and 
commitment. I have also tried to show that psychotherapy must be directed at a wider 
ethical or psychological development or learning process than involving a pure focus on the 
sexual problems.  
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Differences and Similarities  
between Existential Therapy and CBT 
 
Introduction 
In this essay, I will compare and contrast the cognitive-behavioral approach to 
psychotherapy with the existential approach by addressing theories of Aaron Beck, David 
Clarks and Adrian Wells, Jeffrey Young and Emmy van Deurzen. 
 
The cognitive-behavioral approach 
Aaron Beck established Cognitive therapy (CT) on a clinical basis for the treatment of 
depressive patients. This gradually led to the development of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 
(CBT), integrating methods and concepts from behaviorism and behavior therapy. As a 
reaction against the psychoanalytic understanding of depression as aggression turned 
inward, Beck describes depression as an expression of the activation of a cognitive triad, 
where the patient interprets its world, itself and its future in a negative way (Beck 1970: 
255-6). Whereas classical psychoanalysis bases on the ontological principle that drives are 
fundamental to human psyche, the cognitive approach bases on the ontological principle 
that cognition is fundamental. This means that cognitive structures are the major 
determinants of human behavior and feelings. Beck took inspiration from Jean Piaget’s 
cognitive-constructivist theory of development, assuming that different experiences lead 
individuals to construct cognitive schemas that contain basic assumptions about 
themselves, the future and the world (Piaget 1972). Human beings use these schemas to 
organize perception and behavior. The depressive person has formed a depressive 
schema, containing dysfunctional assumptions (Fennell 2009: 172; Williams 2009: 263) 
His interpretation of his experiences, his explanations for their occurrence, 
and his outlook for the future, show respectively, themes of personal 
deficiency, of self-blame and negative expectations. These idiosyncratic 
themes pervade not only his interpretations of immediate situations but also 
his free associations, his ruminations, and his reflections (Beck 1970: 285) 
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Critical incidents activate dysfunctional assumptions that produce negative automatic 
thoughts, leading in turn to other behavioral, motivational, emotional and physical 
symptoms of depression. This produces new negative automatic thoughts, forming a vicious 
circle. According to Beck, systematic logical errors maintain the depressive schemas. 
Following the integration of behavioral components in the establishment of CBT, different 
theorists have started to focus on the way in which dysfunctional life strategies maintain 
dysfunctional schemas and assumptions. 
The CBT-approach bases on the conventional diagnostic approach to psychopathology. It 
covers more psychopathological phenomena than depression. As an example, David Clark 
and Adrian Wells developed a cognitive model of social phobia following the general 
cognitive idea that expectations and interpretations produce negative emotions. States of 
anxiety are due to a systematic overestimation of the danger in a given situation (Clark 
2009b: 54). Based on early experiences, patients have developed dysfunctional 
assumptions about themselves in social situations, leading them to interpret normal social 
interactions in a negative way viewing them as signs of danger. These interpretations trigger 
in social situations. The interpretations in turn trigger an anxiety program, consisting of 
three interlinked components: (1) the somatic and cognitive symptoms of anxiety; (2) the 
safety behavior in which the patients engage to reduce threat and prevent feared 
outcomes; (3) and a shift in the patients attention to monitoring and observation of 
themselves (Clark 2009b; 127-8). 
In other words, depression, social phobia and other disorders are specific 
psychopathological phenomena that are due to deficient learning of cognitive structures 
and behavioral skills. Therapy is primarily oriented towards faulty cognition and behavior. 
The strategy of therapy is to target this deficiency through a corrective learning process, 
including behavioral experiments, verification of expectations and confrontation of beliefs. 
More accurately, therapists use a variety of emotional, cognitive and behavioral techniques, 
designed to suit individual patients. This includes debating irrational beliefs, gathering data 
on assumptions one has made, learning new coping skills, keeping a record of activities, 
engaging in Socratic dialogue, carrying out homework assignments, forming alternative 
interpretations, changing one’s language and thinking patterns and confronting faulty 
beliefs etc. (ibid: 140-3; Beck 1970: 319-30). In recent years, the approach of CBT includes 
a broad range of strategies that Nicole Rosenberg lists as follows:  
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(1) A psychoeducational strategy aiming at educating the patient in his mental 
illness;  
(2) An insight contracting strategy, with the aim that the patient obtains a 
better understanding of his mental processes;  
(3) A problemsolving or coping strategy aimed at learning the patient new 
skills and new ways of thinking and acquiring more effective ways of coping 
with problems (Rosenberg 2007: 244). 
In the 1990’s, the second wave of the cognitive-behavioral tradition was established. This 
included Jeffrey Young’s schema therapy, integrating elements from attachment 
theory.  Young developed schema therapy for treatment of patients with personality 
disorders that have proved difficult to treat with traditional short-term CBT. Schema 
therapy is a clinical educational method, focusing on early maladaptive schemas, defined 
as: 
…self-defeating emotional and cognitive patterns that begin early in our 
development and repeat throughout life (Young 2003: 7) 
The inspiration from attachment theory reflects in the assumption that learning of early 
maladaptive schemas result from unmet core emotional needs in childhood (ibid:9). If 
patients develop these schemas, they will either surrender to them by using cognitive filters 
and self-destructive behavior patterns, or they will block the release of the schemas by 
cognitive, emotional or behavioral avoidance, or they will overcompensate by the help of 
cognitive or behavioral patterns (ibid: 34-5).  Therapy is a learning process, involving:  
 An assessment and education phase where the goal of treatment is to teach patients 
to strengthen the healthy schemas, so that they can learn to navigate, negotiate 
with or neutralize their dysfunctional schemas;  
 A change phase where the goal is to learn cognitive, emotional and behavioral 
changes aiming to help the patient to fight the maladaptive schemas and destructive 
ways of coping (ibid: 44-5). 
The reason why straight CBT does not work with personality disorder is that people who 
have not learned early adaptive schemas need a more thorough treatment.  However, in 
general, it can be viewed as a common assumption in both CBT and schema therapy that 
31 
 
the patients have never learned to do cognitive and behavioral ’self-care’, which they have 
to learn through therapy. Since the motivation for change and the personal responsibility 
for the way of responding to events is crucial to both these theories, the educational notions 
of choice and responsibility is the core of the cognitive-behavioral approach. The therapist 
must take a very intervening and active role as a teacher or consultant to facilitate the 
learning process of the patient. Therapy is present-centered and very strategically oriented 
to specific mental conditions and structured around clear goals and techniques of 
treatment. 
 
Comparing with the existential approach 
Whereas the cognitive-behavioral tradition bases on the ontological idea that cognition 
constitutes the essence of human being, the existential tradition rejects any essentialist 
conceptualization of human being. Instead, the existential approach bases on the 
ontological idea that existence is the core of human being and that existence precedes 
essence. This also involves a rejection of the conventional diagnostic approach to 
psychopathology, based on the idea that it is possible to make a fundamental distinction 
between essentially normal and pathological ways of functioning. Whereas the cognitive-
behavioral approach focused on the incorporation of dysfunctional and maladaptive 
thinking leading to emotional and behavioral disturbances, Emmy van Deurzen articulates 
the object of existential psychotherapy as the dilemmas of living that must be “addressed 
in moral and human terms rather than in terms of sickness and health” (Deurzen 2007: xiii). 
These dilemmas are not manifestations of specific dysfunctions but expressions of diverse 
difficulties in relation to coming to terms with life’s challenges. People inevitably experience 
anxiety in the confrontation with the challenges of life and have a tendency to turn away 
from them and lose themselves in shared cultural ideas of the perfect and problem free life, 
which paradoxically might lead them into misery and distress (ibid: 17).  Thus, these 
problems come from a misguided philosophy of life. The biggest challenge to these people 
is not to overcome the dilemmas of life but to affirm and make “creative use of the very 
paradox involved in living” (ibid: 18). Unlike the cognitive-behavioral approach, the aim of 
existential therapy is not to cure people or change their dysfunctional way of adapting to 
the world but help them learn the art of living as a personal way of tackling life’s problems. 
Thus, similar to the cognitive-behavioral approach therapy is a learning process, but the aim 
of learning is described in terms of discovering a meaning with life and living authentically 
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rather than in terms of achieving more adaptive ways of functioning.  While especially the 
CBT approach put much emphasis on the unlearning of dysfunctional cognitive schemas and 
assumptions and therefore primarily focus on the transformation of the inner 
consciousness, van Deurzen furthermore puts more emphasis on encouraging the clients to 
explore the ways in which they relate to the world as dimensions of worldly being.  In 
addition, whereas the cognitive-behavioral approach tends to put emphasis on the learning 
of specific functional cognitive, behavioral and emotional skills, van Deurzen finds it more 
importance that the clients learn their own personal answers to life’s challenges: 
Attempting to coach people who feel alienated in particular skills or in ways 
of expressing themselves may be counterproductive and result in more 
rather than less alienation (ibid: 20) 
However, similar to the cognitive-behavioral approach, van Deurzen provides much 
emphasis on the notions of choice and responsibility by assuming: 
…the importance of the client’s capacity for making well-informed choices 
about her own life and her attitude towards it (ibid: 2) 
Additionally, just as the cognitive approach assumes that human being has learned a certain 
schematic disposition in relation to how it organizes perception and governs and evaluates 
behavior, van Deurzen describes how a person’s way of relating to the world connects to 
the meanings he or she has created through his or her life. In turn, the learning process in 
the existential therapy focuses not on unlearning of old schemas, assumptions and 
strategies, strengthening of healthy skills and acquirement of new skills but on uncovering, 
exploring and developing those assumptions, talents and values, which are already there, 
even though they may be deeply hidden (ibid: 21). Whereas the cognitive-behavioral 
therapist tends to work as a teacher, using specific techniques and strategies, the existential 
therapist works as a mentor in the art of living and stresses understanding and reflections 
first and techniques second (Ibid: 25).  According to van Deurzen, the practice of existential 
therapy must base on wisdom and integrity rather than on technical expertise, and the 
therapist must therefore have achieved autonomy, openness, existential maturity and 





In CBT and schema therapy, the focus of the learning process is on a collaborative 
relationship where the therapist assists the patient in identifying dysfunctional beliefs 
schemas and discovering alternative strategies for living and promotes corrective 
experiences that lead to new skills. As the patient gains insight into its problems, it must 
actively practice changing thinking and acting. Similar to the existential approach, the 
cognitive-behavioral approach therefore emphasizes the individual’s responsibility for his 
own life and the opportunity to make choices and change his living conditions. Both 
approaches also stress the importance of the here-and-now encounter and emphasize the 
ability of human being as a reflective and acting creature. Whereas CBT does not put much 
emphasis on relationships, schema therapy has more in common with the existential 
therapy in emphasizing human relationality.  One of the major differences is the focus in 
existential therapy on the authentic dimension. While there are differences between the 
two approaches there are also similarities, and many insights and practices from the 
cognitive-behavioral approach might be integrated into existential therapy. Especially 
schema therapy focuses on learning new skills and strengthening existing skills for cognitive, 
emotional and behavioral self-care, and this insight can be integrated into the existential 
focus on the learning of the ability to live life in an authentic way. 
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A Problematization of Therapeutic Neutrality 
 
Introduction 
The therapeutic relationship between therapist and client is a crucial element in 
psychotherapy. An investigation conducted by Orlinsky and Howard in 1986 even concluded 
that the primary factor in successful therapy is the relationship that therapists form with 
their clients (Orlinsky (1986)). Thus, the constituent process of the clinical situation is a 
certain kind of interpersonal activity between two human subjects. In this article, I will try 
to accentuate psychotherapy as a dialectic relation, established between two subjects. I will 
do this in order to problematize Sigmund Freud’s traditional psychoanalytic conception of 
the analyst as a neutral field. The main purpose is to discuss how far it actually might be 
rewarding to take into consideration a conception of analyst subjectivity, how such a 
conception may work in therapeutic practice, and whether an orientation towards analyst 
subjectivity has any negative sides. In order to make this discussion, I will draw on insights 
from relational psychoanalyst Stephen Mitchell and existential psychotherapist Ernesto 
Spinelli, and see whether their criticisms of the neutral stance have any similarities. 
 
Sigmund Freud: The analyst as a blank screen 
Freud invented the most traditional conception of psychotherapy. Fundamentally, he 
understood the human personality as a biologically drive-based system of psychic energy, 
shaped by childhood experiences. Freud called attention to the presence of unconscious 
processes, conflicts and defence-mechanisms beyond individual behaviour.  Neurotic 
disorders in adults were considered to be the effect of repressed and split off sexual 
conflicts in childhood, and the therapeutic aim of the psychoanalyst was to assist the client 
in making these unconscious conflicts conscious, reintegrating his or her personality. In the 
clinical situation, the client approached the therapist according to patterns from his or her 
childhood, making transferences of past feelings and attitudes. In return, the therapist 
should act according to a principle of neutrality as a blank screen for the projection of the 
client’s feelings and attitudes in order to throw light on his or her way of approaching 
relationships. 
The doctor should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show 
them nothing but what is shown to them (Freud 2001: 118) 
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This means, that the practice of psychoanalysis involves an asymmetrical relationship, 
where the client is supposed to reveal his or her subjectivity as a decentered subject to the 
therapist, being a transference object or “sterile field” (Rachman (2004)). Freud 
acknowledged that the therapist might experience emotional reactions towards the client’s 
transference, accounted for as counter-transference. However, the trained therapist should 
work on keeping a neutral stance and not reveal any personal information. Thus, the 
analyst’s emotional state must always be one of objectivity and neutrality. The double 
question is (1) whether it is actually possible at all for a therapist to eliminate him- or herself 
as a real person in the clinical situation, and (2) whether such an ambition might not also 
“preclude an empathic, authentic and warm attitude” towards the client and thereby 
reduce therapeutic effectiveness (Lemma (2007), 45).  I will try to outline two alternative 
approaches that accept a notion of analytic subjectivity: a relational psychoanalytic 
approach and an existential psychotherapeutic approach. 
 
Stephen Mitchell: Intersubjectivity in the therapeutic relationship 
Mitchell confronts the traditional conception of psychoanalysis by articulating a paradigm 
shift from drive theory to relational psychoanalysis. According to Mitchell, mental problems 
are due to disorders in our interpersonal relationships rather than caused by repressed 
drives. Therefore, he introduces a relational model, integrating of insights from object-
relations-theory, attachment theory, interpersonal theory and self-psychology. According 
to this model, not drives but relationships with other people are basic to our mental life and 
personal development. Thus, our mind is “fundamentally dyadic and interactive” (Mitchell 
1988: 3) and all psychodynamic phenomena are conceived from: 
a multifaceted relational matrix which takes into account self-organization, 
attachment to others (“objects”), interpersonal transactions, and the active 
role of the analysand in the continual re-creation of his subjective world 
[and] which encompasses both intrapsychic and interpersonal realms (8-9) 
The human self is relational by design. We are connected and constructed as subjective and 
individual human beings through ongoing inter-subjectivity. 
One cannot become a human being in the abstract […] Embeddedness is 
endemic to human experience – I become the person I am in interaction with 
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others. The way I feel it necessary to be with them is the person I take myself 
to be (275-6) 
We are pursuing and maintaining relatedness. Psychopathology involves a failure to relate 
and grow, rooted in certain conflictual interactional patterns in our relational world. We 
internalize such patterns at an early stage in life, re-experiencing them in adulthood (148). 
Furthermore, we are not just passive victims of experience. We are also active creators and 
perpetuators of our conflictual relational configurations (172). 
Mitchell describes this as a position in between psychoanalytic determinism and radical 
existentialism. The aim of therapy is to give the client – who is stuck in a maladaptive 
relational matrix – an increased awareness of  
…himself as both the design and the designer that makes possible a richer 
experience of living (270) 
Psychoanalysis does not involve treatment for a mental disease. It involves a loosening of 
relational restraints, generated when the client was grooving up. According to Mitchell, the 
therapeutic relationship is almost similar to other human relationships. That is exactly why 
it allows the client to experience and change the basic structures of his or her relational 
world. This involves a two-person approach to the therapeutic relationship where the 
therapist is not an objective field outside of the client’s world. Rather, the therapist is rooted 
in the client’s relational matrix (292). The therapist is not a blank screen but enters a 
personal relationship with the client, which however: 
…does not grant a license to the analyst to do whatever he feels like. He must 
always strive to sustain […] the analytic attitude, by continually reflecting on 
and questioning all the data of the analytic hour and maintaining at all times 
a concern for the patient’s ultimate well-being (293) 
The job of the therapist is to help the client understand and reshape his or her relational 
patterns, and the therapist offers his or her own different – but not more real or mature – 
perspective on the constant transference-countertransference integrations. 
What is therapeutic is not a surrender to the analyst’s illusory wisdom and 




To offer the client this space, the therapist must operate with a lot of restraint and make 
sure that mutual love and hate develop and appear in the therapeutic relationship, but only 
within some limitations. As the client is encouraged to be irresponsible and surrender to 
the situation in order to let feelings emerge, the therapist must love and 
hate responsibly, which involves “to be aware of and to cultivate his feelings, associations 
and reveries” (Mitchell 2003: 131).  The therapist must let his personality be present in the 
clinical situation, but only by using responsibility as a shaping factor and never occlude the 
focus on the client’s well-being (134). This means that Mitchell allows inter-subjectivity in 
the therapeutic relationship as recognition of the fact that the therapist cannot ignore his 
own person. As well as an introduction of a useful factor for therapeutic effectiveness. 
However, he maintains a notion of psychotherapy as organized around an asymmetrical 
relationship, because he replaces the principle of neutrality with a principle of 
responsibility, even though he also introduces some element of symmetry. 
This principle of responsibility is very important, because Rachman points out how the move 
beyond neutrality involves the danger of letting lose “the exhibitionistic needs and 
tendencies of a narcissistic analyst“(Rachman 2004: 221).  Therefore, the self-disclosure of 
the therapist must be used very cautious and not facilitate a way for the therapist to satisfy 
needs for admiration, love or an obedient audience: “Such disclosures are disguised as 
tenderness, but are actually self-serving” (229). As Cooper correspondingly points out, it is 
important not to detract the inclusion of the therapeutic subjectivity from seeing it as an 
analytic function. Therefore, he suggests a distinction between analyst disclosure and self-
disclosure (Cooper 1998). Analyst disclosure is selective and must only be used as to 
uncover elements in the clients relationship to the therapist – that is from the analyst’s 
perspective some sort of asymmetry must be retained in order to restrain the mutuality in 
the therapeutic relationship and the main focus must be on the client’s developmental 
process. Even though this approach no longer views the therapist as a blank screen, it is 
important that the therapist does not take a full step out of anonymity and discloses his or 
her own life experiences or manipulates the client. 
 
Ernesto Spinelli: The therapeutic relationship as an interactive 
encounter 
Spinelli’s alternative to Freud is rooted in the tradition of existential psychotherapy, which 
has a philosophical and scientific foundation quite different from that of psychoanalysis. In 
contrast to the Freudian conception, the existential approaches emphasizes that human 
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personality has no universal essence. Instead of reducing human beings to their nature, this 
perspective perceives human beings from their existence. That is the way we are in our 
world with others and ourselves and what it means to us. The person is not a fixed entity 
but is constantly in a process of becoming. Therefore, the existential approach bases on a 
phenomenological perspective, emphasizing our levels of experience as we exist and give 
meaning to our self and our surroundings. Furthermore, this perspective involves that we 
are not separate and distinct entities but beings-in-the-world, whose experience of 
ourselves and others “emerge of, and through and irreducible grounding of relatedness” 
(Spinelli 2007: 12).  Accordingly, Spinelli views our subjectivity as an expression of 
relatedness and thereby his idea of human being has strong similarities to Mitchell’s notion 
of a relational self: 
…no self can be ‘found’, nor individual ‘emerge’ other than via the a priori 
interrelational grounding from which our unique sense of being arises 
(Spinelli 2007: 14) 
From different perspectives, Mitchell and Spinelli both reject strong individual subjectivism, 
although Spinelli uses a broader concept about relationships, covering relationships with 
self, others and the world.  In this respect, Spinelli is very influenced by the intersubjective 
existential-phenomenologist Buber and his distinction between ‘I-It’ and ‘I-Thou’. The latter 
is an attitude towards the other grounded in interpersonal relatedness between subjects, 
whereas the first is an attitude towards the other grounded in objectification and control. 
The primary I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being [...] I become 
through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living is 
meeting (Buber 2004: 17) 
Spinelli accentuates the ‘I-Thou’ attitude and – like Mitchell – he highlights the quality of 
the relationship between therapist and client. He views the therapeutic relationship as an 
interactive encounter in an intersubjective realm, where both parts have to recognize the 
“specialness and uniqueness of the on-going relationship” (Spinelli 2006: 208).  Like 
Mitchell, he also challenges the ideal of neutrality and wants the therapist to acknowledge 
his or her feelings towards the client without “acting upon them”, in order to prevent abuse. 
Instead, the therapist must encounter “self and other as beings who strive to approach 
mutual responsibility and equality” (67) and regard the feelings as useful for the 
relationship. Spinelli does not think it is possible for the therapist to ignore his or her own 
person and completely avoid self-disclosure. Yet, he also see the dangers in this self-
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disclosure because it often serves the interest of the therapist and not that of the client 
(163). However, the therapist is engaged in the relationship and has no ability to be 
objective. The therapist may make a certain use of disclosure as long as it does not take 
away the focus from the client (Spinelli 2007: 163). The therapist must attempt to bracket 
all his or her personal preferences in order to be able to step into the client’s world and 
with the client explore the client’s experience of the interpersonal realm through an 
exploration of the therapeutic relationship. 
…the therapeutic relationship is seen to be the ‘microcosm’ through which 
the ‘macrocosm’ of the client’s lived reality is expressed and opened to 
enquiry (Spinelli 2006: 186) 
Unlike Mitchell, Spinelli does not explain mental disorders as the result of early experiences 
even though he perceives them as emerging from relations, and through therapy the client 
can develop an awareness of his relational way of being and open up for a reconstruction. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to problematize the traditional psychoanalytic idea of 
therapeutic neutrality by addressing ideas from Mitchell and Spinelli. Even though they 
address psychotherapy from different traditions, there seems to be many similarities. Both 
emphasize the fundamentality of human interrelatedness and the quality of the therapeutic 
relationship, and they explain how this relationship gives an opportunity for the client and 
the therapist to explore and change the client’s relational way of being. To be able to engage 
in this process, the therapist must acknowledge his own subjectivity and allow himself or 
herself to engage in the relationship with the client. The therapist will be ineffective if he or 
she tries to act as a blank screen but it is also very important that the therapist does not 
occlude the focus on the client’s wellbeing. Even though it is not possible or preferable that 
the therapist tries to attain neutrality, the therapist will still need to be responsible or 
bracket his or her own preferences. Psychotherapy involves an intersubjective interaction 
between two persons, but it must always be oriented towards the wellbeing of the client 
and not the therapist’s needs for attention. 
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